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"KEEP THE CHANGE!": A CRITIQUE OF THE NO ACTUAL
INJURY DEFENSE TO LIQUIDATED DAMAGES-Lind Build-
ing Corp. v. Pacific Bellevue Developments, 55 Wash. App. 70, 776
P.2d 977 (Div. 1), review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1021, 781 P.2d 1322
(1989).
Abstract Most courts judge the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses as of the
time of contract formation. In Lind Building Corp. v. Pacific Bellevue Development, the
court created a "no actual injury" defense to enforcement of liquidated damages clauses by
assessing validity as of the time of trial. This Note concludes that a "no actual injury"
defense to liquidated damages recovery negates the benefits of agreed remedies, fails to
provide a principled policy for enforcement, and produces inequitable results.
Purchaser contracts to purchase realty from seller for $4 million,
agreeing to liquidate damages so that seller may retain a $250,000 ear-
nest money deposit if purchaser subsequently defaults. Eight months
later, purchaser breaches and seller resells the property to a third party
for $5 million. Seller must refund the $250,000 to the purchaser-in-
default.
Contract law helps parties pursue a nearly unlimited variety of bar-
gains by providing legal sanctions to enforce private agreements. Yet
the risk of undercompensation restricts access to the benefits of many
bargains. To overcome the constraints of the enforcement process,
parties can predetermine the damage of a broken promise. Real estate
contracts, therefore, usually include liquidated damages clauses I per-
mitting the seller to retain certain payments as liquidated damages if
the purchaser fails to complete the transaction.2
In Lind Building Corp. v. Pacific Bellevue Developments,3 a Wash-
ington court considered whether a seller of realty may retain a breach-
ing purchaser's deposit as liquidated damages when it appears that the
seller sustained no actual damages from breach. Holding that a liqui-
dated damages clause is unenforceable when there is "no actual loss,"
1. Liquidated damages clauses fix the amount of damages breaching parties must pay in lieu
of performance. "Liquidated damages" refers to the legal conclusion that one such clause is
enforceable, as distinguished from a penalty. Liquidated damages clauses may also be called
"agreed damages" or "stipulated damages" to avoid confusing them with clauses already deemed
enforceable. See, eg., Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 84, 84
(1972). This Note uses the term "liquidated damages clauses" because of its popularity.
2. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITmAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 10.4, at 649
(student ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROPERTY LAW].
3. 55 Wash. App. 70, 776 P.2d 977 (Div. 1), review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1021, 781 P.2d 1322
(1989).
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the first division Court of Appeals announced significant additions to
Washington's liquidated damages law.4
The Lind defense of "no actual injury" eradicates the benefits of
liquidating damages. When ordinary remedial measures for breach
would yield no damages at trial, the defense voids otherwise enforcea-
ble clauses. By preventing parties from relying on their negotiated
clauses, the defense diminishes the advantages of agreed remedies
without delivering reciprocal gains in equity. A no actual injury
defense, therefore, contravenes Washington's long standing policy of
favoring liquidated damages clauses. To preserve the utility of liqui-
dated damages clauses, courts should reject the Lind defense and
judge enforceability as of the time of contract formation.
I. UTILITY OF LIQUIDATING DAMAGES
There are numerous reasons why contracting parties attempt to pre-
determine the amount of damages that will be awarded upon breach.
When parties can be certain that courts will enforce their liquidated
damages clauses, the advantages of relying on such clauses accrue
throughout three phases of contract: formation, breach, and
enforcement.5
Allowing parties to predetermine the remedies for a broken promise
enables them to allocate business risks during contract formation.
First, by negotiating the amount at which to fix damages, parties learn
the nature and range of harm a breach might cause, thus enabling
them to weigh the gains from performance against the costs of breach.
Parties can avoid excessive risk by bargaining for more favorable
terms before accepting contract liability. Second, stipulating damages
helps promisees identify the most reliable promisors with whom to
contract.6 Finally, stipulating damages allows parties to reduce the
4. Lind, 55 Wash. App. at 78, 776 P.2d at 982.
5. Courts "enforce" liquidated damages clauses by upholding them when injured parties
bring suits on contracts to recover liquidated damages and by denying claims for restitution of
payments brought by plaintiffs-in-default. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-718(1)-(2)
(1989).
6. By agreeing to generous liquidated damages clauses, unknown promisors enhance their
credibility and enable promisees to offset the added risk of contracting with unestablished
entities. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 116 (3d ed. 1986). Stipulating damages to
signify reliability has particular application to earnest money agreements. Buyers pay earnest
money at the time of contract to indicate their intention and ability to perform. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 456 (5th ed. 1979).
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risk of undercompensation by enhancing measures of recovery where
ordinary legal measures would be inadequate.7
Liquidated damages clauses help parties decide when breach is effi-
cient. The theory of efficient breach holds that, all other factors being
equal, parties should breach contracts and apply resources towards
more advantageous opportunities when expected gains from breach
exceed the expected costs.8 The uncertainty of litigation makes pre-
dicting precisely when breach has become an efficient alternative
extremely difficult. When parties are certain that courts will uphold
their liquidated damages clauses, however, the cost of breach is fixed
and they can identify more accurately the point at which breach
becomes efficient.9
Liberal enforcement of liquidated damages clauses allows parties to
avoid the risks of litigation. 10 Parties typically use liquidated damages
clauses to replace the speculative nature of jury awards with amounts
they presume will compensate innocent parties. 1 Fixing damages also
reduces the risk of nonrecovery where the indeterminate nature of a
loss would make proof difficult or impossible.
Liberal enforcement also promotes more efficient dispute resolu-
tion.12 First, valid liquidated damages clauses save parties the expense
and delay of preparing for and litigating complicated damages issues,
and save the time of judges, juries and witnesses.' 3 Second, favoring
7. Allowing parties to alter legal measures of damages may prompt parties to enter bargains
that potentially inadequate recoveries might otherwise discourage. See Clarkson, Miller &
Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties= Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 351, 367
[hereinafter Clarkson].
8. See, eg., IL POSNER, supra note 6, at 107. Encouraging breach when it might lead to
efficient use of resources is a primary rationale for the penalty limitation. See Note, Liquidated
Damages as Prima Facie Evidence, 51 IND. L.J. 189, 190-92 (1975).
9. Some commentators argue that courts should not enforce liquidated damages clauses
whose sums greatly exceed actual damages because enforcing such clauses creates incentives for
non-breaching parties to induce breach in undetectable ways. See Clarkson, supra note 7, at
368-70. Spending resources on breach-inducing activities and preventing breach inducement is
wasteful. 1d, at 370-72. This analysis has little application to realty transactions. Parties can
complete them with minimal cooperation or assistance from the other side, thus reducing
opportunities to induce breach. The argument is criticized in Rea, Efficiency Implications of
Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 147, 166 (1984).
10. Sweet, supra note 1, at 87.
11. C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 148 (1935).
12. See Comment, A Critique of the Penalty Limitation on Liquidated Damages, 50 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1055, 1057-58 (1977).
13. Washington courts have favored liquidated damages clauses to expedite litigation since
Reichenbach v. Sage, 13 Wash. 364, 369, 43 P. 354, 355 (1896).
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liquidated damages clauses increases the likelihood of pretrial
settlements. 14
II. THE LAW OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IN
WASHINGTON
Absent a controlling statute, Washington courts determine the
validity of liquidated damages clauses in all types of contracts accord-
ing to the same legal doctrines. 5 Several policy considerations influ-
ence how courts treat liquidated damages provisions. Lind, which
adopted a "no actual injury" defense to liquidated damages recovery,
significantly altered the tests Washington courts use to determine the
enforceability of liquidated damages clauses.
A. Courts Favor True Liquidated Damages Clauses
A distinguishing feature of contract law is the freedom it gives par-
ties to control the substantive legal aspects of their dealings. In Wash-
ington, contractual freedom allows parties to predetermine the
amount of damages payable for a broken promise.' 6 To successfully
challenge a liquidated damages clause, a litigant must assert and prove
that the clause functions as a penalty and, therefore, falls within an
exception to the general rule of enforceability.' 7
The penalty limitation incorporates two important policy considera-
tions--equity and intent. First, courts will not enforce inequitable
clauses.' 8 Second, parties must intend to liquidate damages as fair and
14. See Comment, supra note 12, at 1058. Parties are inclined to settle disputes when each
side expects similar results from litigation. The amount of damages likely to be awarded at trial
is a common cause of misalliance. Fixing the value of damages at contract formation makes the
outcome of a trial more predictable, and settlement becomes more likely. Id.; see also R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 338-39 (1972).
15. Washington's only liquidated damages statute applies exclusively to sales of goods.
WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-718(l) (1989). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 356(1) (1981) extends the functional elements of § 62A.2-718(l) to non-goods transactions.
See infra note 58 (text of § 356(l)).
16. See Walter Implement, Inc. v. Focht, 107 Wash. 2d 553, 558, 730 P.2d 1340, 1343 (1987)
(true liquidated damages clauses favored); see also Management, Inc. v. Schassberger, 39 Wash.
2d 321, 326, 235 P.2d 293, 297 (1951) ("We are loathe to interfere with the rights of parties to
contract as they please between themselves .... ").
17. "Penalty" is defined as a stipulated sum payable on breach of contract, irrespective of the
damages sustained, as a punishment for default. It operates as in terrorem of the offending party
rather than as a measure of compensation for breach. See Management, Inc., 39 Wash. 2d at
326, 235 P.2d at 296 (quoting definition from 15 AM. JUR. Damages § 241 (1938)).
18. Courts consider various factors in deciding whether a clause is inequitable: the relative
bargaining position of the parties, e.g., Focht, 107 Wash. 2d at 558, 730 P.2d at 1343; violation of
the principles of unconscionability, e.g., Artz v. O'Bannon, 17 Wash. App. 421, 427, 562 P.2d
674, 677 (1977); evidence of fraud, illegality, or overreaching, e.g., Madler v. Silverstone, 55
980
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reasonable compensation.19 In deciding whether parties intended a
fixed sum as compensation rather than a penalty, neither the descrip-
tive language in the clause nor the fact that such a clause was included
is controlling; yet both factors are seriously considered.2"
B. Distinguishing Liquidated Damages From Penalties
Washington courts distinguish valid liquidated damages clauses
from penalties by applying two tests: a test of reasonableness and a test
of uncertainty. Specifically, a clause must fix damages at an amount
which represents a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the
harm caused by the breach, and the harm caused by the breach must
be incapable of ascertainment or very difficult to prove.21
1. Reasonableness of Forecasted Damages
The purpose of the reasonableness test is to decide whether a liqui-
dated damages clause sets damages at an amount that is fair in relation
to the breach.22 The test contains two basic components: a timing fea-
ture which gives courts a perspective from which to evaluate fairness,
and a rule of proportion defining the boundaries within which an
amount or formula can be considered fair compensation for breach.
The time of contract formation is generally accepted as the appro-
priate point from which to judge the reasonableness of a stipulated
Wash. 159, 162-63, 104 P. 165, 166 (1909); and the basic fairness of the clause itself, ag.,
Northwest Collectors, Inc. v. Enders, 74 Wash. 2d 585, 594, 446 P.2d 200, 205-06 (1968).
19. See Focht, 107 Wash. 2d at 558-59, 730 P.2d at 1343. The intent standard, once a,
primary element in evaluating liquidated damages clauses, has largely been replaced by
reasonableness and uncertainty tests.
20. Management, Inc., 39 Wash. 2d at 326, 235 P.2d at 297.
21. Focht 107 Wash. 2d at 559, 560, 730 P.2d at 1344 (invalidating an unreasonable clause in
an equipment lease where damages were not difficult to ascertain). The reasonableness and
uncertainty criteria are based on section 339(1) of the first Restatement of Contracts. Section
339(1) provides that liquidated damages clauses are not enforceable unless: "(a) the amount so
fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach, and
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable or very difficult of accurate
estimation." R.FSATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339(1) (1932) (adopted in Washington by
Management Inc., 39 Wash. 2d at 327-28, 235 P.2d at 297). These criteria are consistent with
the salient features of earlier tests. See Madler, 55 Wash. at 165, 104 P. at 167 (enforcing the
forfeiture of $500 earnest money where the stipulated sum was not so disproportionate to the
probable damages suffered as to appear unconscionable and damages from breach were uncertain
in nature).
22. Courts rely on the reasonableness test to eliminate penalties because equitable policies
prevent enforcement of unconscionable clauses and those that disregard principles of
compensation. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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amount or formula.2 3 Washington courts have adopted this prospec-
tive approach.24
To be fair, a clause must not fix damages at an amount dispropor-
tionate to the probable actual damages.25 Courts applying this
requirement typically address two issues: whether the stipulated
amount bears a reasonable relation to actual damages,26 and whether
the parties attempted to make a genuine pre-estimate of just compen-
sation for damages anticipated from breach.2 7 A negative response to
either inquiry ordinarily precludes enforcement of a clause.28
Courts have identified two factors to consider in addressing these
issues. First, a clause should regulate the stipulated amount or
formula so that forecasted damages will be commensurate with the
23. See 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1059 (1964). Three perspectives from which
to judge reasonableness are: a time of contract approach, which upholds a clause if the stipulated
sum was reasonable when made, regardless of the damages actually suffered, see, e.g., infra note
24 (discussing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339(1) (1932)); a time of contract or trial
approach, which upholds a clause if the stipulated sum corresponds to either anticipated or
actual damages, see, e.g., infra notes 58, 65 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 356(1) (1979)); and a time of contract and trial approach, which upholds a clause only if the
stipulated sum corresponds to both anticipated and actual damages; see, e.g., infra notes 59, 65
and accompanying text (discussing the no actual injury defense). This Note refers to the first two
methods as prospective or time of contract approaches, and the third method as a retrospective
or at trial approach.
24. E.g., Focht, 107 Wash. 2d at 559, 730 P.2d at 1343 (reasonableness of forecast judged as of
the time contract was entered). But see infra notes 59, 65 and accompanying text (Lind rejects
prospective approach). Restatement section 339(1) embodies the prospective approach. See
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339(1) illustration 7 (1932) (evidence of no actual harm wholly
immaterial).
25. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at § 149; see also 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 704
(1988).
26. See Northwest Collectors, Inc. v. Enders, 74 Wash. 2d 585, 594, 446 P.2d 200, 206
(1968); see also Brower Co. v. Garrison, 2 Wash. App. 424, 433, 468 P.2d 469, 475 (1970) (any
reasonable relation between anticipated damages and the amount agreed will suffice).
27. E.g., Underwood v. Sterner, 63 Wash. 2d 360, 365, 387 P.2d 366, 369 (1963).
28. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at § 149.
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gravity of expected actual harm.29 Second, forecasted sums should set
damages at levels the parties expect will be compensatory.30
2. Uncertainty of Damages
The uncertainty test requires that the harm from breach be incapa-
ble of ascertainment or very difficult to prove.31 However, the specific
criteria of Washington's uncertainty test remain somewhat ambiguous
because courts enunciate the test in various ways. 32 As a result, courts
applying the test often reach inconsistent results.
Generally, the uncertainty test is satisfied in one of two ways.
Courts often hold that uncertainty requires that neither contract law
nor the agreement furnish a formula for computing damages.33 Alter-
natively, regardless of whether a damages formula exists, some courts
29. For example, where a contract requires performance or non-performance of several acts
of varying degrees of importance, and a clause stipulates the same amount to be paid for the
breach of any or all of these acts, then unless the stipulated amount would provide reasonable
compensation for any combination of breaches, courts routinely find a penalty because the
provision bears no reasonable relation to actual damages. See eg., Sledge v. Arcadia Orchards
Co., 77 Wash. 477, 482-85, 137 P. 1051, 1053-54 (1914).
Similarly, in contracts to perform one specific act, a clause should adjust damages according to
the severity or extent of breach. Failure to do so often accounts for a court's refusal to enforce
liquidated damages clauses in long term executory contracts, such as covenants not to compete,
construction contracts and equipment leases. See Management, Inc. v. Schassberger, 39 Wash.
2d 321, 330-31, 235 P.2d 293, 298-99 (1951) (clause fixing damages at $10,000 for breach of a
covenant not to compete was unreasonable in light of the severity of the anticipated breach); see
also Walter Implement, Inc. v. Focht, 107 Wash. 2d 553, 560-61, 730 P.2d 1340, 1344 (1987).
30. The size of an agreed sum relative to contract price is not controlling on the
reasonableness issue. See Pettet v. Wonders, 23 Wash. App. 795, 801-02, 599 P.2d 1297, 1301
(1979). Courts tend to enforce clauses when evidence of negotiations indicates that the parties
agreed that breach would likely cause the stipulated amount of damages. See, eg., Underwood,
63 Wash. 2d at 367, 387 P.2d at 370 (clause contained a reasonable forecast ofjust compensation
where "parties spent more time discussing the amount of the earnest money 'than anything
else "). Adhesion contracts, therefore, are naturally suspect.
31. Focht 107 Wash. 2d at 559, 730 P.2d at 1343. Requiring that harm be uncertain reflects a
policy of favoring liquidated damages clauses where they will likely increase the efficiency of
resolving contractual disputes. See A. CoRBiN, supra note 23, at § 1060.
32. Four versions of Washington's uncertainty test require the harm from breach to be
"incapable or very difficult of ascertainment," Focht, 107 Wash. 2d at 559, 730 P.2d at 1343;
"incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation," Management, Inc., 39 Wash. 2d at 328, 235
P.2d at 297; "reasonable in the light of the... difficulties of proof of loss," WAsH. REV. CODE
§ 62A.2-718(l) (1989); or "uncertain in their nature and are not readily susceptible of proof by
the ordinary rules of evidence," Madler v. Silverstone, 55 Wash. 159, 165, 104 P. 165, 167 (1909).
33. See, e-g., Focht, 107 Wash. 2d 553, 730 P.2d 1340 (1987). Arguably, the tests create a
conundrum if uncertainty requires that there be no damages formula in the contract because a
valid clause must formulate a reasonable relation between estimated and actual damages. See
Sperry & Snyder, Liquidated Damages Clauses in Real Estate Purchase Agreements-Are They
Enforceable?, 18 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. NEWSL. 5 (1990). For a discussion of how assessing
uncertainty as of contract formation may avoid this dilemma, see infra notes 60-64 and
accompanying text. It is important to note, however, that the uncertainty test is rarely
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find uncertainty where the precise amount or extent of damages is dif-
ficult to ascertain or prove.34
The time at which damages must be uncertain is not clear. The
Washington Supreme Court has not stated whether uncertainty of
damages is to be measured as of the time of contract, the time of
breach, or the time of trial. The most common approach, that of
Restatement of Contracts section 339(1), focuses on the time of con-
tract.35  By adopting section 339(1), Washington courts have likely
made contract formation the proper vantage point for testing the
uncertainty of damages.36
C. The Role of Actual Injury in Resolving Enforceability
Once courts decide that liquidated damages clauses satisfy the tests
of reasonableness and uncertainty, they typically award the stipulated
amounts regardless of whether those sums are greater or less than the
innocent parties' actual injuries. 37 In contrast, when a clause is a pen-
alty, parties may recover only those damages they can prove were
actually sustained.3" The controversial question is what role, if any,
should the amount of injury actually suffered play in determining
whether clauses satisfy the reasonableness and uncertainty tests.39
1. The Role of Actual Injury Prior to Lind
Before Lind, Washington courts viewed evidence of actual harm as
either irrelevant' or relevant only insofar as it provided proof of the
damages parties might reasonably have expected breach to cause at the
determinative and has frequently been criticized. E.g., Grand Union Laundry Co. v. Carney, 88
Wash. 327, 331-32 153 P. 5, 6-7 (1915).
34. E.g., Foster v. Montgomery Ward, 24 Wash. 2d 248, 257-62, 163 P.2d 838, 843-45
(1945).
35. Although a time frame for the uncertainty test is absent from the language of
RESTATEMENT § 339(1), the illustrations indicate that the time of contract is the appropriate
vantage point. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339(1) illustrations 3, 7 (1932).
36. Moreover, the Focht court explicitly followed the reasoning of an Ohio court which stated
that uncertainty must be determined "at the time of the execution of the contract." Focht, 107
Wash. 2d at 561, 730 P.2d at 1344 (following American Fin. Leasing & Servs. Co. v. Miller, 41
Ohio App. 2d 69, 322 N.E.2d 149, 152 (1974)). For cases implying that uncertainty be measured
at the time of trial, see Madler, 55 Wash. at 165, 104 P. at 167; see also infra notes 57-58 and
accompanying text (discussing Lind).
37. See Smith v. Lambert Transfer Co., 109 Wash. 529, 534-35, 187 P. 362, 364 (1920).
38. Mead v. Anton, 33 Wash. 2d 741, 757, 207 P.2d 227, 236 (1949).
39. See generally Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495,
504-09 (1962).
40. See Mead, 33 Wash. 2d at 756, 207 P.2d at 235; see also Erickson v. Green, 47 Wash. 613,
615, 92 P. 449, 450 (1907) (testimony that defendant suffered no actual injuries was immaterial
Vol. 65:977, 1990
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time of contract.4 ' As a result, courts did not require innocent parties
to prove actual injuries to recover under liquidated damages clauses.42
2. Lind Building Corp. v. Pacific Bellevue Developments: A "No
Actual Injury" Defense
In Lind, Lind Building Corporation (Lind) agreed to buy real estate
from Pacific Bellevue Developments (PBD) for nearly $4.15 million.43
The earnest money agreement provided: "If Purchaser defaults, Seller
shall have the right to receive the Deposit from escrow and retain it as
liquidated damages .... "I
The events leading up to the suit were as follows. Rounding and
simplifying, Lind made payments totalling $250,000 as deposits and as
consideration for the right to extend the closing date by four months.45
First, Lind paid $20,000 as an initial deposit upon execution of the
agreement.46 Pursuant to the agreement, Lind paid an additional
deposit of $20,000 to extend the contingency period by thirty days,
and then paid $50,000 more when the contingencies were removed.47
and properly excluded). Evidence of injuries actually suffered is irrelevant because it cannot help
establish reasonableness or uncertainty without violating the prospective approach.
The Pettet court analyzed the role of actual injury in enforcing a liquidated damages clause in
an earnest money agreement. Although reversing the trial court on other grounds, the First
Division Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err by excluding testimony indicating
that the seller was not actually injured. The court stated:
The trial court refused to admit testimony concerning the later sale of the business by the
sellers to third parties, allegedly for some $23,000 more than the buyer in this case had
agreed to pay for it. So far as the sellers' case was based on the liquidated damages clause,
we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard since the test of
reasonableness under such a clause looks to the time that the agreement was entered.
Pettet v. Wonders, 23 Wash. App. 795, 802, 599 P.2d 1297-1301 (Div. 1 1979). Contra Lind
Bldg. Corp. v. Pacific Bellevue Devs., 55 Wash. App. 70, 77-78, 776 P.2d 977, 981-82 (Div. I),
review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1021, 781 P.2d 1322 (1989).
41. Judging from the time of contract, the amount of "actual" injury parties might incur is
relevant because it helps courts decide whether a stipulated amount bears a reasonable relation to
expected actual injuries. See Northwest Collectors, Inc. v. Enders, 74 Wash. 2d 585, 593-95, 446
P.2d 200, 205-06 (1968) (clause in an equipment lease was a penalty where it required payment
of the full contract amount whether breach was total or partial because the fixed amount bore no
reasonable relation to potential actual damages); see also Smith, 109 Wash. at 534-35, 187 P. at
364; Brower Co. v. Garrison, 2 Wash. App. 424, 432-35, 468 P.2d 469, 475-77 (1970).
42. See, eg., American Copper, Brass & Iron Works v. Galland-Burke Brewing & Malting
Co., 30 Wash. 178, 187-88, 70 P. 236, 239 (1902) (reversible error to admit hearsay evidence that
aggrieved party suffered no actual injury and to instruct jury that aggrieved party was required to
show evidence of actual injuries).
43. Lind Bldg. Corp. v. Pacific Bellevue Devs., 55 Wash. App. 70, 71, 776 P.2d 977, 978,
(Div. 1) review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1021, 781 P.2d 1322 (1989).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 71-72, 776 P.2d at 978-79.
46. Id. at 71, 776 P.2d at 978.
47. Id. at 71, 776 P.2d at 978-79.
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Lind paid the remaining $160,000 toward the purchase price incre-
mentally to extend the closing date.48
Eight months after executing the contract, Lind failed to complete
the transaction by the amended closing date and PBD notified Lind
that it had forfeited its $250,000 deposit.4 9 A month later, PBD resold
the property to a third party for $1 million more than Lind had agreed
to pay for it.50
Lind sued PBD to recover all deposit payments that PBD retained
as liquidated damages upon Lind's failure to complete the transaction.
At issue in Lind was whether the seller was entitled to keep the
$250,000 as liquidated damages. The trial court ruled that it was and
enforced the liquidated damages clause .5  The First Division Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and held that the clause was a
penalty.5 2
The appellate court in Lind reconsidered the proper role of actual
injury in determining enforceability of liquidated damages clauses.
The court held that where it appears at trial that the party seeking to
uphold the clause has suffered "no actual substantial damages, the
requirement... that the amount of liquidated damages be reasonable
in the light of the anticipated or actual loss cannot be satisfied." 3
The Court of Appeals gave three reasons for deciding that the liqui-
dated damages clause was unenforceable. 4 The court's second reason,
that liquidated damages clauses will not be enforced where there are
no actual substantial damages, adds a requirement of substantive sig-
nificance to Washington's previous formula for valid liquidated dam-
48. Id. at 72, 776 P.2d at 979.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 82, 776 P.2d at 984.
53. Id. at 77, 776 P.2d at 982.
54. The court stated that:
There are three reasons the liquidated damages clause in this case is unenforceable. The
amount of $250,000 came into existence for reasons unrelated to a provision calling for
liquidated damages and, therefore, does not represent an effort by the parties to make a
reasonable forecast of anticipated damages. The second reason is that, there being no actual
substantial damages, the requirement of the rule that the amount of liquidated damages be
reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss cannot be satisfied. Thirdly,
calculation of the amounts [seller] claims represent losses due to [purchaser's] default are
not difficult of ascertainment or proof.
Id. at 77, 776 P.2d at 981-82 (emphasis added). The court's first and third reasons are not
discussed in this Note.
986
Vol. 65:977, 1990
Liquidated Damages
ages clauses."5  Lind creates a new liquidated damages doctrine-a
"no actual injury" defense. 6
In support of a no actual injury defense, the Lind court relied pri-
marily on three authorities.5 7 These authorities apply the defense in
two distinct manners: first, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts sec-
tion 356(1) requires that damages be uncertain at the time of trial; 8
second, some courts require that stipulated amounts be reasonable at
the time of trial. 9
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE NO ACTUAL INJURY DEFENSE
By relying on two different approaches to the no actual injury
defense, the Lind court offers little guidance on how courts should
apply the defense. Regardless of how the defense is applied, however,
it restricts or at least discourages the use of liquidated damages clauses
in many situations and negates the practical benefits of using liqui-
dated damages clauses.
55. Arguably, the court went further than required in adopting a no actual injury defense.
Each of the court's first and third rationales was a sufficient basis for its decision.
56. The court stated: "the weight of authority and the better-reasoned cases hold that where
there is no actual loss, an otherwise enforceable liquidated damages clause is not enforceable
because to do so would violate the principle that damages should be compensatory only." Lind,
55 Wash. App. at 78, 776 P.2d at 982. This defense is difficult to apply because the opinion fails
to distinguish between no actual damages and no actual loss. "Actual damages" is a term of art
meaning "the nature of injury for which recovery is allowed." BLACK'S LAW DicioNARY 33
(5th ed. 1979). Actual "loss," however, may be a generic term meaning any harm, injury or
deprivation whether or not it would be legally compensable. See id, at 851-52. Labeling the
defense a "no actual injury" defense attempts to avoid a built-in legal conclusion.
57. The court relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981);
Hubbard Business Plaza v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co., 649 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Nev. 1986),
aff'd, 844 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1988); and Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock & Screw Co.,
153 Conn. 681, 220 A.2d 263 (1966). Lind, 55 Wash. App. at 75-80, 776 P.2d at 980-83.
58. Section 356 provides in part:
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an
amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach
and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981). Under § 356(1), if "it is clear that no
loss at all has occurred, a provision fixing a substantial sum as damages is unenforceable"
because damages are not difficult to prove. See id. at comment b; see also id. illustration 4 (if
there has been no actual injury, the clause is a penalty because the actual loss is not difficult to
prove); Note, Liquidated Damages Recovery Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67
CORNELL L. REv. 862, 874-75 (1982).
59. The Norwalk court held that a clause must be reasonable at the time of contract and also
at the time of trial. Norwalk, 220 A.2d at 268. Under Norwalk, if it appears at trial that a breach
caused no harm, an agreement for damages in excess of a nominal amount is unreasonable and
the clause will not be enforced. Id. Similarly, the Hubbard court allowed a contesting party to
defeat a clause by proving that agreed damages were disproportionate to the damages actually
suffered. Hubbard, 649 F. Supp. at 1316-17.
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A. Preserving the Utility of Liquidated Damages Clauses
To preserve the practical benefits of liquidating damages, courts
must assess both the uncertainty of damages and the reasonableness of
stipulated amounts as of the time of contract formation-not the time
of trial.
1. Uncertainty of Damages Must Be Judged as of Contract
Formation
When judged as of the time of contract, requiring that the amount
or extent of damages be uncertain presents no major obstacle to
enforceability. Rarely can contracting parties predetermine precisely
or within a narrow range the amount of damages that would flow from
breach. Unpredictable market fluctuations and variations in the sever-
ity of possible breaches make ascertaining the amount of potential
damages nearly impossible. Because of the ease with which the pro-
spective uncertainty test can be satisfied, courts properly shift their
emphasis to the reasonableness test to distinguish true liquidated dam-
ages clauses from penalties.
Conversely, measuring uncertainty at trial dramatically reduces the
efficacy of liquidated damages clauses by forcing courts to treat many
reasonable clauses as penalties. 6 Requiring uncertainty at trial invali-
dates any clause where the amount of damages is then certain or can
be easily calculated, regardless of the reasonableness of the fixed
amount. Where the law furnishes a standard for computing damages,
the amount will seldom be incapable of ascertainment or very difficult
to prove at trial. In contracts for the sale of goods or real estate, for
example, damages are often measured by the difference between the
contract price and market value at the time of breach; therefore, dam-
ages at trial can often be accurately computed.6" Requiring that the
amount of damages be uncertain at the time of trial, therefore, pre-
cludes the use of liquidated damages clauses in many sales contracts.62
60. See Comment, Liquidated Damages: A Comparison of the Common Law and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1349, 1359 (1977).
61. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-708 (1989). See also infra note 82 (damages
measure in sales of realty). In real estate contracts, market value may be presumed from further
transactions or established by appraisal. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at §§ 44-45. In sales of
goods, if no market exists or market value is difficult to prove, evidence of substitute prices is
admissible, as is opinion evidence. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 62A.2-708 comment 1, .2-
723, .2-724 (1966).
62. In California, parties to goods contracts may liquidate damages only when the goods have
a special value or purpose because agreed remedies are invalid if damages may be conveniently
computed at the time of breach or trial. See Sweet, supra note 1, at 106. Florida law yields
similar results in contracts for the sale of real estate because after breach, the value of the land is
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Such categorical invalidation is especially troublesome in real estate
transactions where the availability of specific performance assumes
that parties assign different values to the same realty.
Where uncertainty requires that there be no ascertainable damages
formula, judging uncertainty at trial rather than contract formation
will invalidate many reasonable clauses. Parties frequently bargain for
a number of performances, any of which might be fulfilled to varying
degrees. Because complex agreements contemplate many combina-
tions of breaches, and hence several possible losses, defining proper
measures of damages can be very difficult at contract execution. At
the time of trial, however, courts seldom lack an appropriate formula
for measuring damages.63 Indeed, only when the nature and severity
of a breach are known, can the proper measure of damages be
ascertained.
Courts that distinguish penalties by measuring the uncertainty of
damages at the time of trial will be forced to disallow liquidated dam-
ages in many contractual settings. In such cases, the social benefits of
liquidating damages are completely lost." Judging uncertainty at the
time of trial gives the uncertainty test overwhelming force, which is at
odds with Washington's policy of favoring liquidated damages clauses.
2. Reasonableness of Forecasts Must Be Judged as of Contract
Formation
To maximize the practical benefits of liquidating damages, courts
must evaluate the reasonableness of agreed remedies at the time of
contract, not at the time of breach or trial.6" Although a wide dispar-
ity between the amount of damages stipulated and those actually suf-
then certain. See Note, Liquidated-Damages Clauses in Real Estate Contracts, 4 U. FLA. L. REv.
229, 239 (1951).
63. Time orientations do not affect contracts such as covenants not to compete because no
formulas exist to accurately measure harm from breach.
64. Some commentators suggest that the uncertainty test defeats utility whenever uncertainty
is assessed. Eg., C. McCoRMICK, supra note 11, at § 148 (there is no valid reason why parties
should not be allowed to "relieve the judge or jury of the task of fixing damages, even though that
task would be an easy one and its result could readily be forecast"); accord Clarkson, supra note
7, at 354-56.
65. The time of trial approach, adopted in Lind, threatens the utility of liquidated damages
clauses by requiring reasonableness at trial in all cases. See supra notes 23, 59 and accompanying
text (discussing three perspectives from which to judge reasonableness). The better method is to
judge reasonableness at the time of contract, but to enforce exceptional clauses that were
unreasonable when made and yet turn out to be reasonable in fact. This approach is consistent
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981), and WASH. REv. CODE
§ 62A.2-718(l) (1989). This method maximizes the utility of stipulating damages by enforcing
the largest number of clauses.
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fered may be evidence that a forecast was unreasonable when made,66
it should never be dispositive.
a. Liquidating Damages To Apportion Risk
Reasonableness must be judged as of contract formation to afford
parties the advantage of managing business and litigation risks.67
Using this prospective approach, courts recognize that parties to liqui-
dated damages clauses do not expect their estimates of damages to be
exact. During negotiations, parties agree to fix damages at the amount
of expected losses to reduce the risk that breach will leave them
undercompensated. When parties believe that their genuine pre-esti-
mates of damages will be enforced, they can allocate risk burdens in
exchange for adjustments to the contract price.68
On the other hand, judging reasonableness at the time of trial pre-
vents parties from effectively predetermining remedies. Reasonable-
ness at trial requires estimated damages to approximate damages in
fact sustained, whether or not forecasts were reasonable when made.
Therefore, if circumstances change unexpectedly following contract
formation and injuries suffered are disproportionate to sums stipu-
lated, courts will not enforce the liquidated damages clauses, claiming
they are unreasonable.
In certain cases, therefore, allocations of risk that were reasonable
when made will be ineffectual when reasonableness is assessed at the
time of trial. Where a primary purpose behind liquidating damages is
to allocate risk, the clauses may go unused for fear that failure to
anticipate damages accurately will lead to a waste of resources. In
more extreme cases, parties may refrain from certain contracts alto-
gether rather than accepting the risk of undercompensation.69
b. Liquidating Damages To Resolve Disputes Efficiently
Assessing the reasonableness of stipulated sums as of contract for-
mation improves the efficiency of resolving contractual disputes by
reducing the number of litigable issues. Actual injury is irrelevant
66. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing the role of actual injury prior to
Lind).
67. See supra notes 5-7, 10-11 and accompanying text (utility of liquidated damages clauses).
68. "[Sleller, in making an earnest money agreement, can simply demand more protection-a
larger deposit of earnest money-or even dispense with a liquidated damages provision
altogether." Mahoney v. Tingley, 85 Wash. 2d 95, 100, 529 P.2d 1068, 1071 (1975). The
Mahoney court assumed seller preferred the certainty of a liquidated damages clause to the risk
of seeking actual damages and that purchasers understood and relied upon the liability limitation
in the clause. Id. at 99-100, 529 P.2d at 1071.
69. See Clarkson, supra note 7, at 367.
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under the prospective approach except perhaps as evidence of the
amount of damages parties might have reasonably anticipated.7" Par-
ties and courts save valuable resources. In contrast, when reasonable-
ness requires that stipulated sums approximate injuries actually
suffered, parties must fully litigate (at great expense and delay) that
which they sought not to litigate. Indeed, where the amount at stake
is low, the cost of resolving actual injury issues might exceed the bene-
fits of the bargain, thus deterring contract enforcement.
Assessing reasonableness as of contract formation also creates
incentives for parties to settle. To encourage out-of-court settlements,
liquidated damages laws must minimize disparities between the results
each side expects from litigation 7' and make clauses harder to chal-
lenge under the penalty doctrine.72 Prospective reasonableness fur-
thers these dual aims by expanding the range of enforceability.
Instead of upholding only estimates that approximate actual harm, the
prospective approach upholds estimates that are reasonable in the
light of anticipated or actual losses. Increasing the likelihood that
clauses will be enforced makes them less susceptible to challenge and
harmonizes parties' expected outcomes.
B. Courts Should Reject the No Actual Injury Defense
Courts should reject the no actual injury defense because it negates
many of the practical benefits of liquidated damages clauses. This ret-
rospective look at agreed remedies could ultimately leave many if not
most liquidated damages clauses open to attack. Furthermore, the
defense turns on an arbitrary test and leads to the very inequitable
results it was meant to avoid.
1. The Defense Negates the Utility of Liquidated Damages Clauses
The no actual injury defense negates certain practical benefits of fix-
ing damages by requiring both uncertainty and reasonableness at the
time of trial.73 First, to the extent that parties believe the defense
might apply to their contracts, they are likely not to attempt to liqui-
date damages, thus sacrificing the social gains of expedient dispute res-
70. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing the role of actual injury prior to
Lind).
71. If each side expects substantially different results from litigation, parties will reach an
impasse in settlement negotiations.
72. To the extent that a clause is arguably a penalty, the clause may itself be challenged and
function as an impediment to settlement.
73. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (discussing time frame of no actual injury
defense).
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olution. Second, although the defense is intended to be an exception
to the general rule of enforceability, it could lead to a more generalized
use of the retrospective approach, thereby compounding losses in util-
ity and efficiency.
Although the Lind court conceded that Washington courts have not
required claimants to prove actual damages to recover liquidated dam-
ages, 74 permitting contestants to assert a no actual injury defense
might indeed have that effect. By allowing the focus to shift from
anticipated to actual damages, courts could emphasize the retrospec-
tive approach in a substantial number of cases, consequently prevent-
ing parties and the judiciary from realizing the full benefits of agreed
remedies.
2. The Defense Imposes an Arbitrary Test
Courts should also reject the no actual injury defense because it is
an arbitrary restriction on liquidated damages clauses. The Lind court
sought to justify the defense on the basis of substantive fairness. In
theory, defining reasonableness as substantive fairness allows courts to
base enforcement decisions on the fundamental remedial principle of
contract law-just compensation. Assuming that compensatory dam-
ages are a fair measure of actual harm, the no actual injury defense is
arbitrary because it selectively invokes compensatory principles to
invalidate certain liquidated damages clauses. Strict compensation
alone can provide a principled policy in support of the defense only if
uniformly applied to liquidated damages clauses.75 Yet, the Lind
defense nullifies only clauses that overliquidate damages when the
damages suffered are nominal.
The arbitrariness of a no actual injury defense is illustrated by two
Washington cases where noncompensatory liquidated damages clauses
were enforced: the first upholds an underliquidated damages clause;
the second awards overliquidated damages. In Mahoney v. Tingley,76
a divided appellate court held that vendors of property who agreed to
fix damages at $200 in an earnest money contract were entitled to
recover their actual damages of $3,140 because the applicable measure
of damages was reasonably capable of ascertainment. The supreme
court reversed, holding that where a stipulated sum limits the injured
74. Lind Bldg. Corp. v. Pacific Bellevue Devs., 55 Wash. App. 70, 78, 776 P.2d 977, 982,
(Div. 1) review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1021, 781 P.2d 1322 (1989). See supra note 42 and
accompanying text (discussing the role of actual injury before Lind).
75. Refusing to enforce all clauses whose awards deviate from the measure of compensatory
damages at trial, however, would eradicate predetermined remedies from the law of contract.
76. 85 Wash. 2d 95, 529 P.2d 1068 (1975), reversing 10 Wash. App. 814, 520 P.2d 628 (1974).
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party's loss there is no penalty, though the result is
noncompensatory.
77
Jennings v. McCormick presented the opposite situation.78 The
plaintiff sought recovery of $200 loaned to defendants to construct a
dike. A clause provided for recovery of that sum as liquidated dam-
ages if defendants injured plaintiff's dike during construction. Based
on the trial court's instruction to award actual damages suffered up to
$200, the jury awarded plaintiff $100. The supreme court reversed,
holding that because the agreement was for liquidated damages, the
recovery should have been fixed at $200, the amount upon which the
parties agreed.79
Assuming that parties satisfy the tests of reasonableness and uncer-
tainty at the time of contract, Mahoney would enforce a clause even
though actual injury greatly exceeds the agreed amount. Conse-
quently, injured parties would be undercompensated. Jennings sug-
gests a tolerance for overcompensation so long as the amount is not so
excessive as to be unconscionable.8 0 In contrast, when breach causes
no injury, Lind's defense arbitrarily voids any overcompensatory
clauses. To the extent that courts relieve parties of bad bargains only
when they lead to overcompensation, compensatory principles fail to
justify a bright line defense at "no actual injury."'"
3. The Defense Produces Inequitable Results
The no actual injury defense leads to results that violate the very
principles of equity the Lind court purportedly sought to further. This
inequity results from a flaw in the basic premise of the no actual injury
defense-that where a legal definition of damages yields a value of
zero, breach caused no actual "loss." When legal definitions of recog-
nizable harm prove too narrow to fully indemnify all remedial inter-
ests in certain contracts, invalidating liquidated damages clauses on
the grounds of overliquidation deprives parties of complete relief.
Indeed, in real estate transactions, aggrieved sellers often suffer very
real injury even if they ultimately sell their property at or above origi-
nal contract prices.
Lind illustrates that real estate purchase and sale agreements pres-
ent a situation in which legal definitions of actual harm are unduly
77. Id; accord Underwood v. Sterner, 63 Wash. 2d 360, 387 P.2d 366 (1963).
78. Jennings v. McCormick, 25 Wash. 427, 65 P. 764 (1901).
79. Id. at 429, 65 P. at 765.
80. Accord Smith v. Lambert Transfer Co., 109 Wash. 529, 534-35, 187 P. 362, 364 (1920).
81. Lind's defense is arbitrary not only because it allows undercompensation, but also because
it allows overcompensation so long as actual injury exceeds zero.
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restricted. The general legal measure of damages for loss of a bargain
to purchase or sell real estate is the contract price minus market price
at the time of breach. 2 Accordingly, any time innocent sellers achieve
equal or higher prices in later transactions, the no actual injury
defense compels them to relinquish deposits. To fully compensate
innocent sellers, however, courts must look beyond standard measures
of damages to see that all legitimate contract interests are protected.
The general loss-of-bargain measure ignores several protectable con-
tract interests.8 3 First, the standard measure fails to compensate sell-
ers for allowing potential buyers to hold salable property off the
market prior to closing. Much like option contracts, earnest money
agreements give buyers the right to purchase property and prohibit
sale to third parties for a specified time.8 4 However, sellers of options
receive valuable consideration whether or not buyers exercise their
right to purchase, whereas under Lind, sellers using earnest money
agreements receive no compensation unless the market value of their
property declines. Thus, in strong property markets, earnest money
buyers can force sellers to hold salable property off the market for the
term of the agreement and refuse to close sales with impunity. 5 Inso-
far as purchasers under the Lind rule are enriched, innocent sellers
may have a restitution interest in the earnest money proceeds.8 6 The
standard legal measure of damages ignores this actual loss.
Second, ordinary remedial formulas fail to account for the likeli-
hood that parties negotiated liquidated damages clauses to allocate
risks of undercompensation. Sellers of real estate decrease their risk of
undercompensation by demanding higher earnest money deposits.8 7
In response, purchasers demand price concessions for increasing their
82. PROPERTY LAW, supra note 2, at § 10.3.
83. See PROPERTY LAW, supra note 2, at § 10.3 (loss-of-bargain damages may leave parties
undercompensated).
84. Corinthian Corp. v. White & Bollard, 74 Wash. 2d 50, 52, 442 P.2d 950, 952 (1968) (an
option contract exchanges, for valuable consideration, the privilege of buying the property within
a specified time upon the terms and conditions expressed in the option).
85. By impeding sales of property to third parties, defaulting buyers receive the benefit of
their bargains without a quid pro quo. "Consider the result achieved by the purchaser in Lind. At
a time when the prime rate was running between 11 and 11-1/2 percent, the Purchaser was able
to tie up a multi-million dollar piece of property for eight months at no cost." Sperry & Snyder,
supra note 33, at 5.
86. Sales of goods remedies recognize an analogous interest. Under WAsH. REV. CODE
§ 62A.2-718(3)(b) (1989), sellers of goods can offset breaching purchasers' claims for recovery of
payments to the extent they can establish that such purchasers received any direct or indirect
benefit from the contract. Similarly, regardless of actual injury, WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.2-
718(2)(b) (1989), entitles sellers of goods to retain deposit payments of a minimum of 20% of the
value of the total performance or $500, whichever is smaller.
87. See supra note 68 (Mahoney v. Tingley).
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exposure to liability. Courts permitting a no actual injury defense may
undercompensate sellers by ignoring that sellers pay risk premiums.
Finally, the no actual injury defense ignores sellers' transaction and
opportunity costs attributable to buyers' breach. Once any contingen-
cies expire, sellers incur financing costs until the date set for closing.
In addition, sellers frequently bear the costs of negotiating and draft-
ing documents, brokers' commissions, surveys, appraisals, and the
like."8 Under loss-of-bargain damages, such costs are deemed neces-
sary to complete performance, and their recovery is disallowed even
though sellers might have to tolerate successive breaches before finally
completing a sale.89 To the extent that such transaction costs have no
value in later agreements, in rising markets the no actual injury
defense denies sellers complete relief.
Moreover, sellers may need sale proceeds to facilitate further trans-
actions. If markets rise, they suffer lost opportunities when defaulting
buyers force them to reenter the market later and at higher prices. By
failing to compensate these transaction and opportunity costs, the no
actual injury defense leads to unfair results in real estate transactions.
Courts could produce more equitable outcomes by enforcing remedies
that parties fairly and knowingly presumed would compensate them
for their harm.
IV. CONCLUSION
Favoring liquidated damages clauses secures the utility of agreed
remedies. Allocating business and litigation risks through liquidated
damages clauses helps parties ensure adequate relief for broken
promises. Contractual freedom to predetermine remedies expedites
dispute resolution. Together, these benefits remove economic barriers
and create incentives to contract.
In Lind Building Corp. v. Pacific Bellevue Developments, the court
created a "no actual injury" defense to liquidated damages recovery by
holding that a liquidated damages clause is unenforceable if the inno-
cent party would receive no damages under a contract minus market
formulation. To apply the defense, courts must assess clauses' validity
by the facts at the time of trial, in addition to the circumstances sur-
rounding parties when they formed their agreements.
88. PROPERTY LAW, supra note 2, at § 10.3.
89. Platts v. Arney, 50 Wash. 2d 42, 46-47, 309 P.2d 372, 375 (1957). In a strong market, for
example, buyers could pledge several earnest money deposits at once to avoid missing favorable
buys. If buyers breach some of their contracts, Lind requires sellers who eventually recover the
original contract price in later sales to refund prior deposits.
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Deviating from the traditional prospective approach threatens the
utility of liquidated damages clauses by making their validity unpre-
dictable. Moreover, compensatory principles fail to justify the no
actual injury defense. Indeed, to the extent that ordinary remedial
measures exclude legitimate contract interests, the defense is founded
on a faulty premise and leads to the very inequities it was created to
avoid.
To perpetuate Washington's policy favoring liquidated damages
clauses, courts should reject the no actual injury defense. Judging
validity as of contract formation amply safeguards against penalties
while maximizing the benefits of predetermined remedies. When par-
ties freely and fairly fix damages in advance, rather than rewriting
their agreements, courts should permit innocent parties to "keep the
change!"
James Arthur Weisfield
